ATA Coin

Key facts

Trust guarantees

These six are properties of the deployed bytecode, not policies:

1. The supply can never grow. Exactly 1,000,000,000 ATA exist; there is no mint function in the contract.
2. Nobody can freeze, pause, or censor transfers. Those functions don't exist, and a test fails the build if anyone ever adds one.
3. The deployer never holds the supply. 100% is minted atomically at deployment, straight to vesting contracts and multisigs — the deploy script asserts the deployer balance is zero afterwards.
4. The founder cannot sell early. The 10% founder allocation sits in a public vesting contract: nothing withdrawable for 12 months, fully vested only at year 5.
5. The treasury cannot be dumped. Half the supply (50%) vests linearly over 4 years to a disclosed multisig (allocation config).
6. The community fund streams — it never sits. The 25% community allocation releases linearly over 3 years with no cliff; nobody, including its own multisig, can move it faster (vesting contract).

The consequence of the six: 85% of the supply is locked in on-chain vesting streams that nobody — founder included — can accelerate. The remaining 15% is different, and this page says so plainly rather than rounding it up to a stronger claim.

One launch commitment — the liquidity lock

The 15% liquidity allocation is minted liquid so it can seed the launch DEX pool. Pairing it with ETH and locking or burning the LP tokens is a required launch step (LAUNCH.md, Phase 5), not a property of the bytecode. Until the lock transaction hash is committed to the repository and shown on this page, that float is held by — and movable by — the disclosed Treasury Safe, which is founder-controlled at launch (TREASURY-POLICY.md). Verify the lock happened; don't take this page's word for it.

This website is part of the same discipline: it is a static page with no backend, no cookies, no analytics, no external scripts, and no wallet connection — its content-security policy only permits reading public blockchain RPC endpoints. The source of this page is in the repository.

Live on-chain state

ATA is not deployed yet, so there is no live state to show. Once a deployment record is committed, this section reads supply, balances, and vesting state directly from public RPC endpoints — each endpoint must first prove it serves the expected chain — and renders the results here.

Tokenomics

The allocation below is 100% of the supply — there are no hidden allocations, no pre-sales, and no side deals. It is defined in a single configuration file consumed by both the deployment and the test suite, and rendered here from the same data.

Vesting timeline

Vesting is enforced by on-chain contracts. Withdrawals before the cliff are impossible; the schedule cannot be accelerated by anyone, including the beneficiary. Full details in TOKENOMICS.md.

How it is governed

The token contract has no privileged functions at all, so governance — now or ever — cannot mint, freeze, pause, or claw back anyone's balance. The only things governance will ever control are the treasury funds and off-chain project decisions. That limit is permanent, because the code to do otherwise does not exist.

Who controls the project today

Plainly: the founder does. Both multisig Safes launch as 2-of-3 with two founder keys, which means the founder's keys alone meet the signing threshold. What constrains that is not headcount but code and disclosure — 85% of supply is locked in vesting streams no signer can accelerate, every Safe transaction goes through a public delay of at least 72 hours, and every spend is announced in advance and recorded. The project says this rather than describing itself as decentralised on day one.

The four phases

1. Phase 0 — multisig stewardship. Founder custody, disclosed as such, metered by the vesting streams and the execution delay.
2. Phase 0.5 — the Community Signer Program. Two Safe seats become elected community seats and the Safes grow to 3-of-5, split so no bloc reaches quorum alone. This is the first real transfer of power, and it happens before any DAO.
3. Phase 1 — Governor and Timelock, once measurable criteria hold (below).
4. Phase 2 — treasury handover and founder sunset. The Safes transfer to the Timelock; token holders control all project funds.

What has to be true before Phase 1

Vesting is specified to the second, so the criteria that end founder control are given as numbers too — a threshold that cannot fail is not a threshold:

• the largest holder that is not a project vesting wallet, Safe, or pool holds under 20% of circulating supply, and at least 500 addresses hold 1,000 ATA or more;
• at least 15% of circulating supply is delegated;
• the Governor contracts and their parameters have been externally audited and the report published.

Every quarterly report must publish the current value of each metric with the query used to compute it. Once all three hold for two consecutive reports, Phase 1 work must begin within 90 days — or that report must name the specific blocker and a dated remedy. Silence is not an option the policy allows. Full detail: GOVERNANCE.md.

One consequence worth stating: tokens sitting in vesting wallets cannot vote, because those contracts have no delegate function. At launch that is 85% of supply, and the only freely delegatable ATA is the liquidity float held by the founder-controlled Safe. That is precisely why no Governor exists at launch and why nothing of consequence is decided by token vote until distribution has actually broadened.

Treasury, spending, and the founder's own limits

Two multisig Safes hold project funds: a Treasury Safe and a Community Safe. Both are bound by published policy, and the constraints are designed to be checkable by anyone rather than taken on trust.

Rules on every spend

• An on-chain delay of at least 72 hours on every Safe transaction. There is no fast path — emergencies are disclosed immediately and queued through the same delay. Anyone can verify a Safe's delay module with the repository's check-delay script; a PASS from it against both Safes is a launch gate.
• A quarterly cap: treasury spending in any quarter may not exceed 10% of the treasury tokens the vesting stream had already released at the quarter's start. The schedule caps what can move; this caps what does.
• 72 hours of public notice before execution — amount, recipient, purpose.
• An append-only ledger recording every executed spend with its transaction hash.
• No founder self-dealing. No community program may pay the founder, a founder-side signer, or any address they control.

The founder's published limits

Beyond the on-chain vesting — nothing withdrawable for 12 months, then linear to year five — the founder is bound by commitments that are policy rather than code, and are worded so a breach would be visible on-chain:

• sales in any quarter are capped at 10% of the tokens already released;
• 30 days' advance notice of any sale window, published in the repository;
• one disclosed address — transfers elsewhere count as sales;
• no sales in the 7 days after a major announcement;
• transferring ownership of the vesting wallet counts as a sale of the entire remaining stream, because economically that is what it is.

Read them in full: TREASURY-POLICY.md · COMMUNITY-POLICY.md · FOUNDER-COMMITMENTS.md. These are documents, not bytecode — which is exactly why they are written to be checkable against public chain data.

Transparency reporting

From launch, a report is published every quarter, within 14 days of the quarter's end, covering on-chain state, treasury activity against the cap, community programs, founder compliance, decentralisation progress, and any policy changes. The on-chain section is generated by a script in the repository, so anyone can reproduce the published numbers rather than believe them (TRANSPARENCY.md).

Where the project stands

ATA is not deployed. No token exists on any network, no addresses are published, and nothing is for sale. The repository is complete and tested; the launch sequence has hard gates, and they have not been passed.

1. Testnet rehearsal on Base Sepolia — free, repeated until it is boring. Not yet run.
2. External audit — a hard gate. An independent professional review at a pinned commit, published in the repository. The internal review explicitly does not substitute for it. Not yet done.
3. Legal review, real Safes created with their delay modules installed and verified, and hardware-backed keys. Not yet done.
4. Mainnet deployment, source verification, and the deployment record committed to the repository.
5. Liquidity pool and LP lock, with the lock transaction hash committed and shown on this page.

The internal sign-off approves the testnet rehearsal only. For mainnet it is conditional, and it states that it is void if the audit, the legal review, or the key and Safe requirements are skipped (SIGNOFF.md, LAUNCH.md).

Verify it yourself

Don't take this page's word for anything. Every claim above can be checked in a few minutes:

1. Open the token contract on Basescan's Read Contract tab — the contract source is here until an address exists to link. Call totalSupply() — it returns 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ and can never change.
2. Look at the contract's function list. There is no mint, no pause, no blacklist, no owner. What isn't there cannot be abused.
3. Check the token's holder list. It matches the allocation table above, and the deployer holds zero.
4. Open a vesting wallet and read cliff(), end() and releasable(token) — the lock-ups above are live on-chain state, not promises.
5. The source code of every contract is published and verified on the explorer, and the repository history shows how it was built and tested.

Questions people actually ask

Who controls the project right now?

The founder. Both Safes launch as 2-of-3 with two founder keys, so the founder alone meets the threshold. What limits that is code and disclosure, not headcount — and control moves in published phases, starting with elected community signer seats.

Can the founder sell everything tomorrow?

No. The founder's 10% is in a vesting contract with nothing withdrawable for twelve months and full vesting only at year five, and no one can accelerate it. After the cliff, published limits apply — see the founder commitments above.

Can more than 1,000,000,000 ATA ever exist?

No. There is no mint function in the contract, so there is no mechanism to create more — not for the founder, not for a future governance vote.

Has it been audited?

Not yet, and the site will say so until it has been. An independent external audit is a hard gate before mainnet; the internal review does not substitute for it.

Who wrote the code?

Claude — Anthropic's AI — wrote the contracts, tests, scripts, this website and the documentation, under the repository owner's direction and review. The internal review was performed by the same AI that wrote the code, which is one of the reasons the external audit is non-negotiable. The git history records the whole process.

Why Base rather than Ethereum mainnet or a new chain?

Base gives Ethereum-grade security at fees of a cent or less, with full wallet and DEX compatibility. A new chain would cost years and give holders nothing extra here.

Is there an ATA wallet or app to install?

No, deliberately. ATA is a standard ERC-20 and works in the wallet you already use. Anything claiming to be an official ATA wallet is not.

When does it launch?

There is no date, and you should be sceptical of anyone who gives you one. Launch is gated on the steps under “Where the project stands”, not on a calendar.

Risks and limits

The code closes the failure modes that are within the project's control. It cannot close the others, and this section exists so nobody has to go looking for them.

What the code cannot protect you from

• Market risk. Most tokens end up worth little or nothing. Nothing in this codebase changes that, and nobody speaking for this project may suggest otherwise.
• Signature phishing. ATA supports gasless approvals by signature (EIP-2612 permit). A malicious site can present one disguised as something harmless. Never sign typed-data messages from a site you do not trust — true of every permit-enabled token, this one included.
• Impersonation. Anyone can deploy a token called “ATA Coin” and anyone can copy this page. Only the address published in the repository is real.
• Key custody. The vesting beneficiary and the Safe signers remain single-point human responsibilities.
• Public RPC dependence. The live figures on this page come from free public endpoints, which can rate-limit or misbehave. They degrade visibly, but they are not a service guarantee.

What is not done yet

• No external audit. No legal review. No Safes, and therefore no execution-delay module — the delay is a launch requirement, and it does not exist until the Safes do.
• No liquidity pool and no LP lock, so the liquidity float is not yet locked.
• The internal review reports a full test suite and complete contract coverage, enforced in CI. That is evidence, not an audit, and it was produced by the same author as the code (SIGNOFF.md, SYSTEM-REVIEW.md).

Legal status

ATA is described as a fixed-supply digital asset with on-chain governance readiness — not as an investment and not as a claim on anything. Regulatory treatment differs by jurisdiction, including the EU's MiCA regime and 2027 anti-money-laundering rules, US enforcement posture, and Türkiye's prohibition on using crypto as a payment instrument. Counsel review is a pre-launch gate. See LEGAL.md — which is a risk checklist written by engineers, not legal advice.

Reporting a vulnerability

Open a private security advisory on the repository (GitHub → Security → Advisories). Please do not open public issues for security reports; good-faith reports are acknowledged within 72 hours (SECURITY.md).

Using ATA

ATA is a standard ERC-20 token. It works in the wallet you already have — MetaMask, Coinbase Wallet, Rabby, Ledger, Trezor — with no special software. There is deliberately no "ATA wallet": custom wallets concentrate risk, and the standard is the feature.

To see ATA in your wallet, add the contract address published on this page as a custom token, on the network shown in the badge above. Only addresses published here and in the repository README are real — anyone can deploy a fake token with the same name.

For AI assistants, the repository ships a read-only MCP server that answers questions about supply, vesting, and treasury state from live chain data.

How this was built

The contracts, tests, scripts, this website and the documentation were written by Claude — Anthropic's AI — under the repository owner's direction and review. The internal sign-off in the repository was produced by the same AI that wrote the code it assesses. That circularity is stated rather than hidden, and it is one of the reasons an independent external audit is a hard gate before anything is deployed to mainnet.

This disclosure is here because the project's own honesty rules apply to the project itself: how the code was produced is a material fact. The full development history is public in the repository. See README — How this was built.

Official links

This page is canonical at bgenc48.github.io/ATA-Coin, which is published by CI only from a commit where every check passed. The same files are also built automatically by two Cloudflare properties that do not wait for those checks, and a third path publishes by hand, so if you are reading this page at any other address, check it against the repository before trusting it.

• Repository: github.com/Bgenc48/ATA-Coin
• Start here: Guide · Tokenomics · FAQ (on this page)
• Policies: Governance · Treasury · Community · Founder commitments · Transparency
• Risk and review: Security · Legal · Sign-off · System review · Launch playbook
• Records: deployment records · spend ledger · source of this page
• For AI assistants: a read-only MCP server — claude mcp add ata-coin -- node mcp/bin/launch.mjs
• Contract addresses: published in the badge above and in the repository's deployments/ directory once deployed — nowhere else.

Nobody representing ATA will ever contact you asking for funds, private keys, or "listing fees". Anything like that is an impersonation attempt.